



**EXAME DE PROFICIÊNCIA EM LÍNGUA INGLESA PARA ALUNOS DE
RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS GRADUAÇÃO - 2022/2**

Nome: _____

Curso: _____

ATENÇÃO

- Apresentar documento de identidade com foto. **Não é permitido** o uso de crachá de funcionário e carteirinha de estudante da PUCRS.
- Entregar a prova no prazo de **2 (duas) horas**.
- Responda às perguntas referentes ao texto em **PORTUGUÊS**. Respostas em língua inglesa não serão corrigidas.
- Utilize somente dicionários ou gramáticas, em papel, da língua inglesa, e nenhum outro material de consulta ou equipamento eletrônico. **Não é permitido o empréstimo de materiais**.
- Leia atentamente o que se pede. A correta interpretação das questões faz parte da prova.
- As respostas devem ser à caneta e devem estar na folha da prova. A folha de **rascunho não será corrigida**.
- Serão considerados aprovados os candidatos que demonstrarem proficiência, com aproveitamento igual ou superior a 50% de acertos.

I - Responda às questões 1 – 7 de acordo com o texto abaixo:

Nuclear weapon-free zones and the issue of maritime transit in Latin America

[J Luis Rodriguez](#), [Elizabeth Mendenhall](#), [Author Notes](#)

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The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 made Latin American governments acutely aware of the risks associated with the nuclear arms race. To prevent such dangers impinging on their region, Latin American states crafted a treaty constituting the first nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in a densely populated area less than five years after the crisis. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean—commonly known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco—opened for signature on 14 February 1967, and entered into force on 25 April 1969. Tlatelolco institutionalized restraints for non-nuclear powers and commitments from nuclear powers. Other regions have used this NWFZ as an example of how to control the dangers associated with nuclear armaments, especially given that Latin American officials managed to secure the often-elusive support of nuclear powers in crafting their regional nuclear non-proliferation instruments.

During the Tlatelolco discussions, a number of Latin American delegations proposed banning the maritime transit of nuclear weapons and nuclear-powered vessels. However, the evolving dynamics of Cold War nuclear strategy

made the mobility of nuclear weapons, especially on and under the ocean, a priority for the major nuclear powers. The United States argued that such limits, especially in the Panama Canal, would constrain its commitment to hemispheric security and challenge established norms on innocent passage, which allow transit that does not threaten the coastal state's security. It was in this context that Latin American governments aimed to secure nuclear powers' support for Tlatelolco. They calculated that, to make the NWFZ effective, nuclear powers must commit never to threaten or use nuclear weapons against signatories and to respect Latin America's nuclear-free status, including stopping nuclear weapons tests. Thus, it would be easy to conclude that nuclear powers, especially the United States, constrained the contours of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

Despite US opposition, a number of Latin American states repeatedly introduced proposals to ban maritime nuclear transit during the Tlatelolco negotiations. Latin American officials were worried about US and Soviet deployments of nuclear arms, nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines (SSBNs), and the anti-submarine warfare capabilities to counter them. SSBNs could easily bring nuclear conflicts to any region around the globe. Their mere presence raises the risk of accidents, unplanned launches of weapons, or the vessels themselves being targeted. Hence, even when they decided to exclude a limit on maritime nuclear transit from Tlatelolco, Latin American states remained interested in pursuing such a ban. They came to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea negotiations, which started in 1973 (UNCLOS III), with a common position on coastal maritime zones which included limits on maritime nuclear transit.

If several delegations made sustained calls to ban maritime nuclear transit in Tlatelolco, and Latin American states pushed for strict restrictions during UNCLOS III, why did Latin American officials exclude such restrictions from the NWFZ? A realist account focusing on great powers and the outcomes of international negotiations—a top-down approach—would posit that Latin American states gave in to US pressures. This explanation overlooks the agency of Latin American countries in these negotiations and their strategies to coordinate positions and resist US demands. Using an approach centred on historical context and the negotiation process—a bottom-up approach—we focus on the negotiating tactics Latin American officials used to form a common bargaining front in Tlatelolco and enhance their negotiating power *vis-à-vis* nuclear powers. We argue that Latin American states bracketed the maritime nuclear transit discussion at Tlatelolco in order better to resist US pressures on other topics. Rather than ignoring the issue of maritime nuclear transit altogether, Latin American states subsequently brought **it** back to the table during the negotiations to establish UNCLOS.

Questões:

1. Por que é que os Estados latino-americanos excluíram uma proibição de trânsito nuclear marítimo da sua zona regional livre de armas nucleares (NWFZ)? (2 pontos)

2. Segundo os autores, como que outras regiões utilizaram o NWFZ? (1 ponto)

3. De que forma a Guerra Fria mudou este cenário? (1 ponto)

4. Quais os riscos que a presença de submarinos de propulsão nuclear e armamento nuclear causam? (1 ponto)

5. Traduza o segmento extraído do texto para o português (2 pontos)

Hence, even when they decided to exclude a limit on maritime nuclear transit from Tlatelolco, Latin American states remained interested in pursuing such a ban

6. Explique as duas abordagens adotadas pelos autores para explicar por que os latino-americanos excluíram as restrições da NWFZ? (2 pontos).

7. A que se refere o pronome “**it**” (em negrito e sublinhado) em “...Latin American states subsequently brought **it** back to the table during the negotiations to establish UNCLOS”? (1 ponto)
