



Corporatist Ideas in Inter-war Greece: From Theory to Practice (1922–1940)

Spyridon Ploumidis

University of Athens, Greece

Abstract

The article examines the reception, conception and practical application of corporatist ideas in inter-war Greece. Drawing on Peter Williamson's terms, this study looks closely at both consensual- and authoritarian-licensed corporatist theories and policies. In the period under consideration, Greece was a fledgling, fast industrializing society that was significantly affected by the economic advantages and misgivings of the 'gloomy thirties'. High rates of unemployment, which were aggravated by the global economic crisis of 1929, low wages, long working hours and insufficient enforcement of labour law increased the dissatisfaction of the working classes and fanned social unrest.

Consensual-licensed corporatist proposals for 'professional representation' entered the debate on the (re-)establishment of the Senate in 1928–29. Authoritarian-licensed corporatism found a much broader audience and practical scope during the Kondylis and the Metaxas dictatorships in the period 1935–40. Fascist-like corporatist practices were applied in agriculture and in the bargaining of collective agreements that regulated minimum wages and salaries. In fact, Metaxas had pronounced the transformation of his anti-parliamentary regime into a corporatist 'new State'. However, the eventual implementation of corporatist ideas was rather limited. For that matter, I argue that interbellum Greece remained, in its European setting, a marginal case of corporatist theories and policies.

Keywords

Anti-liberalism, authoritarianism, corporatism, fascism, inter-war crisis, labour history, modern Greece

Corresponding author:

Spyridon Ploumidis, Efterpis 16, Holargos, 155 61 Athens, Greece.

Email: sploum@otenet.gr

The story of corporatist ideas in inter-war Europe is complex and multi-dimensional, as it is a concept that has acquired many connotations and has, therefore, become confused in meaning.¹ Peter Williamson argues that the concept of corporatism has been dissipated by its utilization as an 'all-rounder' concept to be applied anywhere, at any time.² Corporatism thus remains an ambiguous concept in the political vocabulary, encompassing a wide range of all too often imprecise definitions.³ Nevertheless, corporatist ideology was once regarded as one of the great 'isms' of industrial society, standing alongside liberal capitalism and socialism during the late nineteenth century and the inter-war period.⁴ Corporatism, which was an intellectual response to the gradual disappearance of the *ancien régime* in continental Europe and to the advent of industrial capitalism and its attendant misgivings, drew heavily on the moral philosophy of Roman Catholicism and on the collectivist impetus of nationalism. While Catholics saw society as an edifice bound together by Christian love, the application of justice and the following of God's will, nationalist corporatists, on the other hand, envisaged society as held together by individual sacrifice to the national good, which was usually interpreted by some self-appointed authoritarian leader. For that matter, corporatist theorists idealized the notion of a harmonious medieval society, and advocated the rebirth of this idyllic societal community, wherein social bonds would be restored (by changes to an industrial society devoid of any higher moral purpose) and class conflict would abate.⁵

Corporatism is understood here as a form of social organization in which corporations, government-licensed bodies with great authority over the professional activities and the lives of their members, play an intermediary role between the working public and the state.⁶ Thus, in the place of the liberal individualistic socio-economic order was to be a collectivist and hierarchical one, and central to the establishment and maintenance of this order was the corporatist state, understood as a state in which government represents and is by and large answerable not to the individual citizen, but to various corporations of which the individual is a functional part.⁷ The economy of the corporatist state is divided into associations (called 'syndicates') of workers, employers and the professions; only one syndicate was to be permitted in each branch of industry, arts or the professions. The corporations were envisaged as partially autonomous in the manner of the medieval estates and guilds, with an analogous political role, mediating between the individual and the central power, and generating independent allegiances which would be pooled and reconciled in the common submission to the central government.⁸ In contrast to Marxism, which bases its 'vertical' theory on the conflicting interests of workers and capitalists, corporatism sought to reduce this conflict through 'horizontal' representation encompassing both employers and employees in the different sectors of the economy.⁹ All in all, corporatism, which was based on an organic conception of state and society, leant heavily on Catholic, neo-Romantic and nationalist ethical assumptions, and was a response to the organizational problems of laissez-faire industrialization; corporatist organization, based not on status or class but on the profession or field of production, would, it was hoped, eliminate class conflict and settle industrial disputes.¹⁰

Williamson identifies three widespread varieties or types of the same generic concept: (a) the 'consensual-licensed' variant; (b) the 'authoritarian-licensed'; and (c) 'neo-corporatism'.¹¹ This paper will examine the first two usages of corporatism in interbellum Greece, since the third and most recent variety was mostly applied to advanced western capitalist polities after the Second World War,¹² and so exceeds the scope of this analysis. The major differences between the first two types of twentieth-century corporatism rest predominately on the basis upon which the intermediaries (i.e. the state-licensed and/or state-sponsored representative bodies) control their members and upon the intermediaries' general relationship to the state. Whereas in both models the state is dominant in the economic and social sphere, the 'consensual-licensed' corporatist structures are so established as to enhance a high degree of consensus about the underlying values and goals of the corporatist system. Such a consensus may result in a limited need for the state to exercise control and a notable degree of autonomy for intermediaries and societal factors.¹³ So, it is of no surprise to historians that 'consensual-licensed' corporatism was preached by social-democratic political theorists, and was put into practice by parliamentary regimes, such as the Weimar Republic.¹⁴

The nexus between 'authoritarian-licensed' corporatism and fascism is rather more tangled. Fascism, as a (in Roger Griffin's terms) 'genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism',¹⁵ provides a group ideal that encourages the individual to transcend his/her private interests and devote him/herself to the benefit of the greater national whole.¹⁶ Certainly, disciplining the workforce and forbidding strikes was a principal instrument in helping to maintain socio-economic affairs in 'authoritarian-licensed' corporatism.¹⁷ Furthermore, fascism and 'authoritarian-licensed' corporatism shared the same enemies: individualistic liberalism, materialistic socialism, pluralism of opinion, party politics and class struggle were all anathema to fascism's and corporatism's concept of national unity.¹⁸ This connection between corporatism and the authoritarian Right became stronger after the Great War, when (due to an increasing awareness of the shortcomings of industrial capitalism and the rise of the challenge of revolutionary socialism) a general change in emphasis took place within corporatist thought: there was less harking back to a bygone idyll, and the arguments for corporatism became to a greater degree pragmatic rather than metaphysical.¹⁹ The historian Eugen Weber notes that the corporatist ideology that Mussolini eventually adopted (in 1927) was not necessarily or characteristically fascist: what was characteristic was Italian Fascism's pragmatic readiness to adopt it.²⁰ In any case, corporatism predated and was an historical antecedent of authoritarian nationalism in twentieth-century Europe, while the generic definition of corporatism permitted (in its 'consensual-licensed' variant) limited pluralism and a degree of societal and economic decentralization.²¹ Thus, while corporatism is widely believed to be implicit in or even specific to fascism,²² a thin line of distinction between fascism (and the other inter-war authoritarianisms, with varying degrees of fascistization) and corporatism needs to be drawn.

Greece underwent the first two variants of corporatism during the 1930s in theory as well as in (limited) practice. Socio-economic developments clearly account for the influence of corporatism upon the country. The 1920s were a period of rapid growth for Greek industry, at an average rate of 6.8 per cent per annum between 1921 and 1929.²³ The chemical and textile industries expanded, while a number of new industries appeared, such as the carpet industry.²⁴ At the same time, between 1917 and 1930 the entire labour force increased from 154,633 to 278,855.²⁵ More importantly, the domestic economy suffered a setback with Greece's default and departure from the gold standard, which was announced on 27 April 1932 by the Liberal Party government of Eleutherios Venizelos.²⁶ Ironically, due to increasing import-substitution and a stringent tariff protection, Greek industry recovered extremely rapidly from 1933 onwards, at a rate of over 9 per cent in the first year alone.²⁷ In the period 1931–1939, 927 new industrial businesses were founded.²⁸ Yet at the same time, between 1930 and 1940, employment in the industrial sector (*stricto sensu*) remained essentially stagnant, as it increased by a mere 17,700, from 157,300 in 1930 to around 175,000 in 1940 (approximately 10%).²⁹ This was because the framework of Greek industry continued to be rather primitive (in terms of international competitiveness, funds, investment in new technology, raw materials and energy resources) throughout the 1930s, and so it was not in a position to give sufficient employment to the newcomers to the labour market.³⁰ In 1936, industry contributed just over 12 per cent to the country's 'national income'.³¹ As a result, from 1933 until the end of the decade, the rate of unemployment stood at around 9 per cent.³²

In addition to the high rates of unemployment, low wages, long working hours and insufficient enforcement of labour law increased the dissatisfaction of the working classes and fanned social unrest.³³ According to the socialist-controlled General Workers' Confederation of Greece, unemployment had risen steeply after the eruption of the global economic crisis in 1929: the number of the unemployed had jumped from around 82,000 in 1928 to 237,356 in 1932, affecting 35 per cent of the workforce.³⁴ Even though these figures were seen as exaggerated by conservative critics, the international crisis undoubtedly had serious repercussions on Greek society.³⁵ By the late 1920s, high population growth, the migration of workers from the fields into the towns (preponderantly to Athens, Piraeus and Salonica), and the drying up of employment in the public sector contributed to the growth of a destitute urban workforce.³⁶ The influx of almost 1.5 million refugees (from Asia Minor, Eastern Thrace, Bulgaria, Russia, et al.) in the early 1920s had an adverse effect on the bargaining power of labour and decisively contributed to the drop in real wages, while refugee workers themselves (who, lacking the support of small property, family ties and clientelism, were under the imminent threat of proletarianization) became the most radical part of labour.³⁷ Labour relations became increasingly embittered after the government's bankruptcy in April 1932.³⁸ The militancy of the unionized working-class was facilitated by the geographical concentration of industry. In 1930, 59.6 per cent of Greek industrial establishments and 75.7 per cent of the workforce

was concentrated in Athens and Piraeus, while another 26 per cent and 18 per cent respectively was found in Salonica.³⁹

At the same time, KKE (the Communist Party of Greece), under a new Stalinist-inspired leadership that had been appointed directly by the Communist International (Comintern) in November 1931, hardened its line towards its bourgeois and socialist opponents.⁴⁰ By that year, the Workers' Centres (i.e. local free workers' syndicates) of Salonica, of the tobacco-growing centres Drama and Kavala, as well as those of Volos and Larissa (the two major towns in Thessaly, Greece's granary) had already come under the influence of the communist-led 'Unitarian' General Workers' Confederation (est. 1929).⁴¹ A series of workers' strikes and violent clashes with the gendarmes and the army in August 1935 had led employers and conservative politicians, such as general Georgios Kondylis (who actually seized power in October 1935 and restored the monarchy two months later), to the idea of enforcing cooperation between capital and labour by means of compulsory arbitration.⁴²

By April 1936 the wave of strikes had attained the proportion of an 'epidemic'.⁴³ On 9 May a strike initiated by the tobacco workers (the most compact, unionized and combative force of the Greek working class and strongly represented in communist organizations) in Salonica produced startling violence: in the ensuing clashes the police opened fire on the protestors, killing 12 and wounding over 200.⁴⁴ The May disturbances were the climax in the Greek history of labour strife.⁴⁵ On 27 July, trade-union leaders declared that a 24-hour general strike would take place on 5 August in protest at the government's plans to implement compulsory arbitration procedures. This announcement provided King George II and his premier Metaxas, a former general and the leader of a small royalist party, who had headed a minority government since 13 April 1936, with the pretext for embarking upon an authoritarian course of action: on 4 August martial law was declared and the parliament was suspended indefinitely.⁴⁶

During the period under consideration, Greece was, in summary, an industrializing society that was significantly affected by the economic advantages and disadvantages of the (to use Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza's term) 'gloomy thirties'.⁴⁷ Despite the bitter history of labour relations, the conception and application of corporatist models in inter-war Greece has been largely overlooked by historians. This historiographical neglect can be primarily attributed to the widespread notion that corporatist ideology is closely associated with Catholic social thought.⁴⁸ Despite the generic validity of Williamson's comment that corporatism did not flourish in countries where there was not a conspicuous and continuing Catholic intellectual tradition,⁴⁹ between 1936 and 1940 general Metaxas' regime actually embraced and variably applied some authoritarian corporatist practices that closely followed the Italian Fascist and the German National Socialist model. Furthermore, from the late 1920s Greece also experienced a limited application of corporatist theories of the 'consensual-licensed' type. Drawing upon evidence from theorists' work and other primary sources, I will attempt to illustrate how closely (or rather distantly) Greece squared with the European model.

Williamson imagines the concept of corporatism as ‘a tangle of seemingly endless threads, seeping at different levels into different domains’.⁵⁰ My aim in this paper is to cut through some of these threads, and to delimit the boundaries between the theory and the practical application of corporatism. Greek corporatist theories (and policies) were part of an international debate, and this cases study is valuable not only for historians of Greece, but also for those more broadly interested in labour relations and anti-liberal economic thought in interbellum Europe.

The ‘Consensual-Licensed’ Version

‘Consensual-licensed’ ideas received a limited audience in Greece. For one thing, Walter Rathenau’s *Der neue Staat* (1919), Émile Durkheim’s *De la division du travail social* (1926), or Mihail Manoilescu’s *Le siècle du corporatisme* (1934), which greatly influenced ‘consensual-licensed’ corporatist theorists between the two world wars,⁵¹ were never translated into Greek. Instead, the majority of the theorists who envisaged some degree of consensus and co-operation in their search for a radical solution to labour unrest, away from liberal political theory, thought along communitarian lines with a strong emphasis on Greek tradition.⁵² For instance, communitarian ideas were expressed in 1932–33 by Kleisthenes Philaretos (son of a famous republican politician, and head of the Department of Industry at the Ministry of National Economy) and his intellectual circle in the periodical *Politismos* (Culture). Philaretos called for a ‘way out from the narrow lane of capitalist and communist materialism’ and a turn to a new intellectual ‘direction’, which would soothe the ‘class and national antagonisms’.⁵³ In July 1932, he appealed for ‘new forms of association in the organization of labour’. These suggested new forms would draw on traditional patterns of professional association that were theoretically employed by the Greek people in the early modern past (i.e. guilds and Ottoman *millet* communities) as well as on the ‘genuine Christian spirit’; they would retain a rigid social ‘evaluated’ hierarchy, while at the same time they would secure ‘comfortable and sufficient life standards’ and the ‘ethical independence of the human individual personality’. Philaretos argued that the Greek ‘nation had been involved in alien systems of life that were impossible to integrate’, namely products of ‘European industrialization’, and thus it ‘was cut off from the genuine Greek forms of life’. In his opinion, solely ‘communitarian models’ could offer ‘genuine and sustainable solutions to the problems’ of Greek society.⁵⁴

In addition to their restricted intellectual influence, ‘consensual-licensed’ corporatist ideas also had a limited practical application in Greece. One example is provided by the structure of the Senate, which was (re-)established in 1929 under the provisions of the 1927 republican constitution. There had been various demands for the (re-)establishment of the Senate (first founded in 1844 and suspended in 1864), inspired, in part, by the Weimar Republic which had established the *Reichsrat* (1919). Similarly calls were first heard in the Greek parliament in March 1922 for the creation of a ‘Supreme Council of the professions and the

productive classes' (alias an 'Economic and Professional Assembly'), following the example of the German *Reichswirtschaftsrat* (founded in 1920 with the representation of 'all important trade and professional groups' as a means of bridging the gaps between competing social classes).⁵⁵ In 1928, Alexandros Svolos (1892–1956), a distinguished professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Athens with overt social-democratic political leanings, intervened in the debate on the Senate and called for 'professional representation' or (as he alternatively termed it) 'representation of interests', which would allow for a broad corporate participation of social classes in the upper chamber and for the coalescence of their antagonistic agendas into a coherent union of interests. He pointed out that his idea explicitly followed the Weimar Republic's principle of *Wirtschaftsverfassung*, which laid the foundations of the *Reichswirtschaftsrat*. Svolos specified that his corporatist suggestions followed the consensual-licensed archetype: he definitively rejected the 'anti-democratic' *stato corporativo* of the 'authoritarian fascist system', and maintained that the 'representation of interests' in a future 'economic Senate' should be based upon their 'voluntary participation' and the 'freedom of assembly', and placed within the context of a 'bourgeois democracy'.⁵⁶

Svolos' arguments were echoed in the doctoral thesis of Michael Dendias, a graduate of the University of Paris who was elected professor of Administrative Law in 1930 and pursued a successful career at the Universities of Salonica and Athens, and who also argued for the 'représentation politique professionnelle, autrement dite représentation des intérêts', which he interpreted as an 'essentially corporatist representation, based on the syndicalist organization'.⁵⁷ The Greek Senate's eventual composition drew partly on this novel (in the Greek legal jargon) corporatist principle (of 'professional representation'): 18 out of the 120 senators were representatives of professional associations (such as the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Chambers of Agriculture, the Technical Chamber and the Union of Greek Ship-owners).⁵⁸ Allusions to corporatist theories are also found in the work of Georgios Theotokas (1905–1966), an Athens lawyer and prominent radical liberal intellectual of the 1930s who later (in 1944) turned to social democracy; in January 1932, Theotokas envisioned, within the framework of an *économie dirigée*, the transformation of the existing Senate into an 'Economic Assembly'.⁵⁹

The 'Authoritarian-Licensed' Variant

The Theory

'Authoritarian-licensed' corporatism was put into practice in Greece by the quasi-fascist regime of Ioannis Metaxas, which was established on 4 August 1936.⁶⁰ Certainly, Metaxas' dictatorship, despite its very limited popularity, was not isolated in ideological terms. Fascist and corporatist ideas of the 'authoritarian' variant were consistently expressed by publicists, intellectuals and economists. In late 1935, an Italian researcher published a book on the corporatist state, based on a

series of lectures that he had offered at the Istituto Italiano di Cultura in Athens during the winter months of that year. In this, he elaborated on the tenets of the Italian corporatist economy, and published (translated in Greek) the text of the founding laws of the Carta del Lavoro (1927), the *corporazioni* and the Consiglio Nazionale delle Corporazioni. His explicit aim was ‘to enable the reader to form a clear idea of the new political and social perceptions that shaped the profound reformation of the Italian State and regulate its existence today’.⁶¹ In 1937–38, three more short studies, by Bruno Biagi (Italy’s Deputy Minister of the Corporations until 1935) and by a naturalized Italian bank officer (Aristides Vecchiarellis), on fascist corporatist principles were published in Greek (the former sponsored by the Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura).⁶² In 1939, a Greek jurist and former MP of Metaxas’ Free Thinkers’ Party (a certain Ioannis Giannopoulos) published an extensive multi-paged work on the fascist and national socialist managed economies and corporatist systems.⁶³

Amongst the most vehement native supporters of corporatism in the academy were Demosthenes Stefanidis (1896–1975), a professor of Political Economy at the University of Salonica, and Ioannis Tournakis, a professor of Applied Political Economy at the Advanced School of Economics and Business Studies (now the Athens University of Economics). About a year after the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship, both academic economists called for the adoption of the Italian fascist corporatist model.⁶⁴ Stefanidis, in particular, overtly renounced liberal theory, and envisaged corporatism as a solution to the malaise of social conflict. In 1937, he argued:

Truly, if we leave, following the liberal economic system, all the clashes between economic interests, mild or extreme alike, to luck, the weaker economic interests will disappear, ... their disappearance will cut deep into the body of the society, thus becoming a perpetual source of enmity and hatred among the various agents of production and the productive classes. On the other hand, the intervention of the state facilitates the invention of compromise solutions, which can thus soften the controversies or even transform them into a cooperation between economic interests for the common good.⁶⁵

Stefanidis maintained that even in the case where a compromise could not be reached, the intervention of the state guaranteed that the ‘economic interests that are sacrificed’ are ‘the least important for the community’, and they will be compensated somehow by means of ‘state resources’. He added that these results can best be achieved, ‘when the structure of the state secures the coming to power of “the best” of the people, of those who stand above the classes and the parties’.⁶⁶ For Stefanidis, who admittedly drew on Robert Michels’ discourse (*Les partis politiques: essai sur les tendances oligarchiques des démocraties*, Paris 1919),⁶⁷ the rule of the elites was a precondition for the ‘broadest possible intervention of the state in the social economy’ and for ‘the allocation of the highest social economic justice’; the rise to power of a political aristocracy (‘of the most educated, the fittest

to rule and, most importantly, the best from a moral perspective'), which would stand above social classes and political parties, and was a condition sine qua non for an efficient corporatist state apparatus.⁶⁸

His suggestion was definitely anti-liberal and anti-parliamentarian. According to Stefanidis, the answer to social conflict could not derive from democratically-elected parties, which are at the behest of financial and other interests and so they lacked objectivity. Parliamentary democracy was an out-dated form of government that was not in line with contemporary social and political conditions, and therefore was no longer in a position to correspond to the need for an energetic state intervention in the social economy.⁶⁹ From Stefanidis' viewpoint, corporatism was certainly a 'middle way' between socialism and 'individualism' (i.e. liberal economy). And it was the only way that secured 'the weaker classes of the society against the stronger ones'; guaranteed 'economic prosperity'; and safeguarded 'the whole *völkisch* economy against the egoistic trends of the alien *völkisch* economies'.⁷⁰ The Greek economist drew his theories from Erwin von Beckerath ('Die Idee der korporativen Wirtschaft', in Gerhard Dobbert, ed., *Die faschistische Wirtschaft: Probleme und Tatsachen*, Berlin 1934), who had opined that the liberal state was 'a thing of the past'.⁷¹

More importantly, Stefanidis advocated the economic policy of fascist Italy and national-socialist Germany. He cited the *Stato corporativo* of Ugo Spirito, the Carta del Lavoro of 1927, and the notions of the Italian *sindacati*, *corporazioni*, *unioni*, *confederazioni*, etc., as well as quoting ideas (about the political aristocracy) from Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. He admittedly admired the alleged fact that 'the economic policy of these states, setting aside the rule of the parties and the impediments that come along with it, placed the nation above everything else and did not hesitate to take even the most radical measures for the attainment of their noble agenda'.⁷² To this effect, Stefanidis' discourse had ostensive nationalist overtones. He stated that 'the supreme aim of the corporatist organization is the nation'; this sort of economic policy, which 'was born in parallel with the exaltation of the national sentiment in multiple countries, ... raises, contrary to the individualism and the cosmopolitanism of the liberal school, the banner of the economic interest of the national community above anything else, and aims at inspiring nationalist ideas'.⁷³ For his part, Tournakis systematically propagated the corporatist economic theory through his periodical *Nea Politiki* (New Politics) from 1937 to 1940. The articles that were published there called for a complete rupture with the liberal economic tradition and a radical turn toward autarkic policies and full adoption of the Italian corporatist model.⁷⁴ However, Metaxas' government turned a deaf ear toward Tournakis' extremist calls.⁷⁵ Random articles in support of Italian corporatism appeared also in *Neon Kratos* (New State), a periodical (issued from September 1937 to March 1941) that more genuinely echoed the Metaxist ideology.⁷⁶

The most coherent presentation of authoritarian-licensed corporatist theory was articulated by Georgios Merkouris, a former Minister of National Economy and leader of the minuscule and unsuccessful Nationalist Socialist Party of

Greece (est. 1933). Unlike the two academic economists, Merkouris' stance in favour of corporatism was not triggered by the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship, but preceded it. In late 1932, some nine months after Greece's bankruptcy, he had already spoken in favour of the adoption of a 'planned economy' on a global level.⁷⁷ For Merkouris, the greatest evil, besides the scourge of unemployment, was 'anarchy'; to this effect, he declared it a patriotic duty to 'closely monitor and fanatically defend the Homeland against [communist] anarchy'.⁷⁸ Merkouris called for the prohibition of 'inimical class rivalry', and for the regulation of social relations according to principles of 'national unity', 'tranquility' and 'social discipline'.⁷⁹ In 1936, he provided a systematic discussion of pertinent thinking in his book *The Corporatist State*.⁸⁰ The right-wing politician declared that he aimed at the 'wider dissemination and popularization' of an 'extremely opportune scientific dogma', that is, corporatism and its ramifications on the state economy.⁸¹ Merkouris defined corporatism as the opposite of 'individualism', 'capitalism' and 'communism', and as 'the most perfect expression of a reasonable social defence against the excesses of liberalism and post-war economic and political exigencies'.⁸²

Merkouris openly based his model corporatist state on Mussolini's fascist example and the 'contemporary economic directions' for a 'new world order' that were initiated in Rome and then 'flooded' into other countries, such as Austria, Germany, Portugal, etc.⁸³ The author denounced 'communist Utopias' as well as the 'utter failure of parliamentarism'.⁸⁴ He rebuked 'class struggle' as a 'dissolving agent', and extolled the 'Nation' as an 'indestructible unifying link'.⁸⁵ Merkouris translated the word 'corporation' into 'συντεχνία', a term that applied to medieval guilds, and explained in plain terms the meaning of the 'categories' (i.e. disparate branches of production and occupations), the syndicates, the corporations and the 'National Council of Corporations', alias the 'Corporatist Assembly'.⁸⁶ For instance, he specified that a 'syndicate' is 'the official and lawfully established association that consists of members of the same profession, handicraft, manual, intellectual or scientific occupation', while he defined the 'corporation' as a 'union of representatives of [state-]recognized syndicates'.⁸⁷ The leader of the National Socialist Party visualized the establishment of an 'Assembly of Corporations', which in its turn would come under the jurisdiction of a 'Ministry of Employment and Corporations'.⁸⁸ However, he added that such state interventionism was not meant to be in the production but solely in the organization of the economy.⁸⁹ The 'syndicates' would be legal public institutions and 'organs of the State'; yet the role of the state would not be to replace, but to 'harmonize', 'discipline' and 'check' private interests.⁹⁰ In other words, his political vision for a corporatist state was, in effect, anti-liberal, rather than anti-capitalist. Merkouris called again in his book for a 'directed economy', and defined work as a 'social duty'.⁹¹

In Practice

The works of Grillenzoni, Biagi, Vecchiarellis, Stefanidis and Giannopoulos naturally found their way into Metaxas' personal library.⁹² However, the initial

political programme of his Free Thinkers' Party (est. 1922) did not include any allusions to corporatist theories; on the contrary, it spoke for 'complete individual and political liberty' and supported free agricultural syndicalism.⁹³ In fact, the utterance of 'authoritarian-licensed' corporatist policies did not precede the collapse of economic liberalism in 1932 and the gradual retreat of political liberalism after the abortive Venizelist army coup of March 1933.⁹⁴ The programme of the first conservative government since Greece's bankruptcy, that of the anti-Venizelist People's Party under the premiership of Panagis Tsaldaris, which was voted in on 11 November 1932, referred to 'the moral and material elevation of the working classes' and the application of the social security law already passed by the Venizelists.⁹⁵ On 3 April 1933 only weeks after the abortive Venizelist coup, Tsaldaris, upon forming his second government, added to his programme 'the harmonious co-operation of the worker with entrepreneurial capital'; and averred that he would suggest the application of measures that had already been applied in other countries with a view to 'blunting any acute clash [between labour and capital] and preventing the eruption of workers' strikes'.⁹⁶ Metaxas himself first publicly expounded his anti-parliamentarian and corporatist views in an interview with *Kathimerini* in January 1934.⁹⁷ The 'permanent cooperation between capital and labour'; the broad implementation of collective agreements; and the 'organizational regulation' of 'collective labour clashes' were finally included in his first parliamentary programme, announced on 25 April 1936.⁹⁸ Similarly, corporatist principles were not actually included in the initial programme of the National Radical Party, an ultra-nationalist party of the authoritarian Right that was established in August 1932 by general Kondylis.⁹⁹ Only after he forcibly seized power (on 10 October 1935) and vested himself with the autocratic powers of a Regent did Kondylis (admittedly an admirer of Mussolini, whom he had personally met twice in July 1935)¹⁰⁰ pronounce, in a public speech delivered on 21 October, the 'cooperation of capital and labour' as a basic tenet of his 'social policy'.¹⁰¹

The first step towards the implementation of corporatism was the foundation of a Ministry of Employment on 14 October 1935.¹⁰² This Ministry (first established in Greece by Kondylis' short-lived dictatorial regime) was a prime tool for the realization of 'authoritarian-licensed' corporatist policies. In late August 1936, Metaxas subordinated the Ministry of Employment to the Ministry of National Economy; on the other hand, he added to its statute the provision that its particular purpose was 'to systematically take care of the harmonious cooperation of labour and capital', as well as 'intervening for the arbitration and resolution of differences between workers and employers that pertain to employment agreements, customs and usages'.¹⁰³ The second institution of these policies entailed the implementation of collective agreements that regulated 'minimum salaries of employees of private businesses and wages of industrial workers'; these agreements were regulated by a decree of the Kondylis dictatorship, which introduced a 'procedure of compulsory arbitration' by the state authorities in their conclusion.¹⁰⁴ The collective bargaining procedures, which were decreed by the Kondylis administration, were not initially accepted by either employers or workers.¹⁰⁵

The actual enforcement of these novel measures awaited the imposition of the Fourth of August dictatorship. Metaxas ratified the first two 'national' collective agreements on 12 August 1936.¹⁰⁶ They were supposed – from the regime's point of view – 'to harmonize the interests of the agents of production' and 'to furnish the true value of labour as a quintessential social function'.¹⁰⁷ The legal validity of these agreements was arbitrarily decreed as solemnly binding, besides the high contracting parties, every other employers' and workers' organization in the country.¹⁰⁸ Decree Law 1435, published in October 1938, vested the General Workers' Confederation (which by then had come under the control of the regime) with the exclusive right of representing all the state-licensed workers' and employees' organizations toward the administrative, judicial and social security authorities, especially in the conclusion of collective employment agreements; it also added that the Confederation would assist in 'the harmonization of the interests' of all those engaged in the fields of production.¹⁰⁹ In that year, Stefanidis hailed the implementation of collective agreements as marking 'real cooperation between the industrialists and their labour personnel in the interests of society'. He further acknowledged with satisfaction that 'the tension between employers and employees, the endless round of strikes and counter-strikes, which previously had disturbed social harmony and impeded industrial progress', seemed to be coming to an end.¹¹⁰ Needless to say, shortly after the establishment of the Fourth of August regime, strikes, lockouts and other interruptions of production were made illegal.¹¹¹

The Fourth of August regime was the only Greek government to aim systematically at putting corporatist ideas into practice. Shortly after assuming power, Metaxas proclaimed that Greece would be organized as a corporatist state. In a speech of 6 September 1936, he declared that the nineteenth century had been marked by the rise of capitalism and laissez-faire liberalism, but that since 1918 these systems had failed, to be replaced nearly everywhere by state systems of a managed economy.¹¹² In an interview in the Berlin *Völkischer Beobachter* published on 24 September 1936, Metaxas pronounced that his 'new State will be corporatist' (*συντεχνιακόν*), and declared that 'organizations of employers and employees' would be founded in each prefecture.¹¹³ Announcements about these plans and more particularly on a future, horizontally-structured (according to the branches of production), Great Council of National Labour were repeated in November by the Finance Minister Konstantinos Zavitsianos.¹¹⁴ According to its semi-official mouthpiece *To Neon Kratos* (The New State), the regime (the self-styled 'new anti-parliamentary State') aimed in the immediate future at the 'reorganization of social and political life on the basis of the doctrine of cooperation and solidarity between the classes'.¹¹⁵ In general terms, Metaxist Greece followed the fascist conservative-nationalist corporatist direction.¹¹⁶ In 1937, a law that decreed May Day as the 'Day of Celebration of Work', specified that work was understood by the government in its 'real National ideological sense'.¹¹⁷

However, these pronouncements were never fully materialized. In mid-1938, the theorists of Metaxas' New State reassured their readers that political representation

of ‘associations of organized groups and the professions’ would definitely be institutionalized, yet admitted that ‘whether or not the Fourth of August State would develop into a Corporatist State’ was still ‘obscure’.¹¹⁸ The intention of organizing economic and political life along corporatist lines is confirmed by the creation at the end of August 1939 of a Deputy Ministry of Corporations (*Υφυπουργείον Συνεταιρισμών*) that was meant eventually to cover every branch of the economy (in addition to agriculture).¹¹⁹ In July 1940, a new law placed the Chambers of Light Industry as well as those of the Professions, which both had first appeared in 1925, under ‘the supervision and the control of the Deputy Ministry of Employment’, and restructured them according to ‘categories’ of manufacture and the professions respectively. While the founding law stated that all the positions in these chambers’ administrative councils would be ‘elective’, the new law stipulated that one-third of their members would henceforward be appointed by the pertinent Deputy Ministry.¹²⁰ On the other hand, the Chambers of (relatively, by Greek standards) Heavy Industry and Commerce, which were first established in 1914, were left untouched by any authoritarian-licensed reform. Nothing similar to the two German *Reichsstände für Handel und Industrie* (National Corporations for Trade and Industry)¹²¹ was established, nor was a law parallel to the Carta del Lavoro¹²² or to the (Nazi) Law on the Organic Structure of the Economy (November 1934)¹²³ ever instituted in Metaxas’ Greece. The novel policy of ‘authoritarian-licensed’ corporatism was never fully applied in Greek industry but solely in agriculture.

Within the context of a policy of ‘directed agriculture’, Metaxas’ regime took rigid steps to improve the material position of farmers; to circumvent urbanism; and to consolidate a conservative agrarian class, loyal to the regime and national ideals.¹²⁴ In March 1938, the state-controlled ‘National Confederation of Agrarian Cooperatives of Greece’ was founded, replacing the liberal ‘Panhellenic Confederation of Farmers’ Cooperative Unions’. The new confederation was placed, by law, under the ‘direct supervision of the head of the government’ and formally became ‘the supreme and universal Organization of all the Cooperative Organizations in the country in general’. The role of the state was strengthened ‘so that it would be in a position to more directly influence the direction’ of the farmers’ cooperative movement, and implement its policy in agriculture ‘in closer cooperation with the Farmers’ Cooperative Organizations’. The founding law stipulated that three out of the 12 members of the confederation’s administrative council would be appointed by the head of the government (i.e. Metaxas), and officially transformed the farmers’ unions into ‘Organs of the State’. The ‘intervention’ and the strengthening of the role of the state in the management of the agrarian economy admittedly followed the German (Nazi) model and was justified, in the text of the law, upon the grounds that its purpose was ‘the elevation of the living standards of the agrarian class’.¹²⁵ On 1 December 1938, a School of Associates (*Σχολή Συνεταιριστών*) was opened at the Advanced School of Economics and Business Studies in Athens. In his speech at the opening ceremony, Metaxas explained that the ‘idea of association’ (*ιδέα του συνεταιρισμού*) was first

applied in agriculture because the farmers constituted the lower stratum of the social pyramid, 'whereupon the rest of the pyramid is based'. In the event, the Greek dictator confirmed his firm belief in the 'doctrine of association', underlying that 'in reality, our freedom is very limited' and 'the whole Nation is, by destiny, nothing else but a huge association'; yet he acknowledged that the 'associative' (or rather corporatist) organization of the 'national body in general' was still 'very far from being considered complete'.¹²⁶

The main corporatist formations that were instituted by the Metaxas regime were the so-called 'Houses of the Farmer' (*Οίκοι του Αγρότου*). The 'Houses of the Farmer' were established in November 1938, and replaced the regional Chambers of Agriculture, that had been founded by Eleutherios Venizelos' liberal government in 1914. Their *raison d'être* was 'the professional and mental indoctrination and enlightenment of the agrarian class, as well as the latter's closer association with the State and the application of the particular Agrarian Policy that is drawn each time by the Ministry of Agriculture'.¹²⁷ In effect, the reformed agricultural chambers would serve as a fixed channel of communication between the farmers and the state, as a state-licensed agent that would mobilize support for government policies, and act as a supplementary bureaucracy that would assist in policy implementation.¹²⁸ The Greek agricultural corporatist syndicates, which were quasi-consonant in their title with the Portuguese *casas do povo* ('Houses of the People'), the agricultural syndical bodies of Salazar's *Estado Novo* (1933–74),¹²⁹ ostensibly drew on the eight Italian *corporazioni* of 'the productive and agricultural cycle', which had been created by Giuseppe Bottai in Mussolini's Italy in 1934,¹³⁰ as well as on the *Bauernschaften* (the *Körperschaften* in the production, processing and trading of agricultural products) that had been established in Hitler's Germany in September 1933.¹³¹

In September 1936, *L'Écho de Paris* likened Metaxas' regime to Salazar's dictatorship, mainly on the grounds that the Metaxist New State was exactly consonant with the *Estado Novo*.¹³² This comparison did not take into account that Portugal, unlike Metaxist Greece, was not a monarchy. Nevertheless, the *Estado Novo* seems to have been a prime source of inspiration for the architects of Metaxas' New Greece, for several laudatory articles on Salazar's 'new Portugal' appeared in *Neon Kratos*, the regime's semi-official mouthpiece.¹³³ In reality, Metaxas' policy of so-called 'directed agriculture'¹³⁴ drew on the Nazi corporate system in agriculture in name only, and the 'Houses of the Farmer' differed substantially from the German model. Whereas the *Reichsnährstand* (the supreme National Sustenance Corporation) determined wholesale and retail prices and production quotas, controlled the quality of fresh as well as of processed products, and was entitled to impose fines and to close down business enterprises or shops,¹³⁵ no such extensive authority was vested by the Greek law in the agricultural syndicates. The scope of the 'Houses of the Farmer' never extended to trade in agricultural produce and the processing of foodstuffs, and the Metaxist 'directed agriculture' was completely detached from the interplay of forces within the market economy. In fact, autarkic policies were seen by Metaxas as a temporary necessity due to

economic nationalism that was prevailing in international economic relations at the time, and his government's financial and social policies remained, along with the majority of the elite of Greek economists (Kyriakos Varvaressos, Xenophon Zolotas, Emmanuel Tsouderos, etc.), ideologically orientated to the post-Bismarckian 'state-socialism' (*Staatssozialismus*) of the *Kathedersozialisten* (such as Adolph Wagner, et al.), as well as to the German New Historical School of Economics (most illustriously represented by Gustav Schmoller), rather than to the authoritarian model of a fascist or *völkisch* economy.¹³⁶

By the time of Greece's entry into the Second World War (on 28 October 1940), corporatist policies had made some progress, but they had not been fully implemented. By August 1940, around 2,000 employees of farmer cooperatives had been trained at the School of Associates.¹³⁷ 'Houses of the Farmer' had been established in all the major towns of the Peloponnese and were gradually expanding to other regions of the country.¹³⁸ The initiation of corporatist policies in the Peloponnese (an area of Old Greece populated by relatively prosperous yeomen, closely connected to clientelist party networks), which was a traditional conservative (anti-Venizelist) and royalist stronghold,¹³⁹ is understandable. The application of such policies in Thessaly, where left-wing agrarian agitation had become deeply rooted since the turn of the twentieth century,¹⁴⁰ as well in Northern Greece (Macedonia and Thrace), especially amongst refugee smallholders (ardent adherents of the republican cause), whose support for the Communist Party had progressed since the downfall of Venizelism in 1935,¹⁴¹ was certainly an onerous task. On the other hand, the measure of collective agreements (of the minimum wage) seemed to have struck a favourable chord. According to official sources, its application was not limited to the major branches of industry, but was expanded, 'almost universally', to all the professions throughout the country. Within the first three years of the semi-fascist dictatorship, 823 collective agreements had reportedly been signed, 133 of which had a general application, whereas 690 had only a local effect.¹⁴² The measure of compulsory arbitration was also broadly applied, to the extent that during the period 4 August 1938 to 4 August 1939 82 per cent of the disputes between employers and their employees (59,748 out of a total of 73,409 cases) were reportedly settled by the officers of the Deputy Ministry of Employment, that is, without the disputants' recourse to the courts.¹⁴³ At the same time, the authorities recognized 1,257 associations of workers and employees as representative of their trades, and placed them – in the interest of 'complete and harmonic cooperation of the different branches of professions' – under the supervision of 41 individual secretariats of the (state-controlled) General Workers' Confederation.¹⁴⁴ For that matter, Decree Law 1435 (which paved the way for the establishment of the professional and industrial syndical associations, the grassroots of the corporatist system) clearly stated that the existing or any other future professional associations could be identified as 'representative' solely by decree of the Deputy Minister of Employment.¹⁴⁵ The exact identity and function of these state-licensed associations are not clear due to lack of evidence. Yet, following the generic corporatist theory, it seems reasonable to assume that membership in these

intermediary organizations would, de facto, be compulsory for all those who wished to engage in a particular economic activity over which these 'representative' organizations claimed authority.¹⁴⁶

Conclusion

First and foremost, the case of corporatist theories in inter-war Greece confirms Mark Mazower's findings (in his study of Greece's experience of the global economic recession) on the close link between economics and politics. The collapse of economic liberalism in 1932 (when the financial crisis peaked in most European countries)¹⁴⁷ and the crisis of parliamentary democracy (from 1933 onwards) inspired some to look for a new role for the modern state with the aim of addressing social problems.¹⁴⁸ Four years after its establishment, the Metaxas regime boasted that 'the new State sought and achieved the cooperation of all the [social] classes in the interests of the National economy and social prosperity'.¹⁴⁹ Yet, in August 1940 Greece was still very far from being a complete corporatist state, and the new authoritarian legislation did not proceed further than the first stage of the corporatist system. These 1,257 state-recognized associations had not been turned into syndicates, that is to say they did not represent employers and managers along with workers and employees. Their categorization (e.g. to something similar to the, all in all, 22 Italian corporations) seemed even more distant, while their vast number, which hardly fell short of the total amount of the pre-existing free workers' and private employees' associations (1,607),¹⁵⁰ far exceeded the 823 state-licensed syndicates of fascist Italy.¹⁵¹ In as much as the Metaxas regime ever reached the mature stage of fascism,¹⁵² corporatism never became the dominant structural or ideological foundation of the Greek economy, let alone Greek politics. The historian of economic thought Michalis Psalidopoulos stresses that, apart from a general consensus on a more rigorous state intervention in the economy, the Metaxist period does not constitute a differentiation from, let alone a rupture with, past economic thought and policies in Greece.¹⁵³ Despite the gradual integration of numerous cooperatives, trade unions and different interest groups into state-controlled horizontally-structured associations, the actual corporations, these all-inclusive vertical organizations, were never established in Greece. What is more, the systematic propagation of 'authoritarian-licensed' ideas by and large coincided with the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship and did *not* precede it.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, it can be argued that intensive theoretical discussion on corporatism came into the picture as a means of opportunist aligning with and courting of the quasi-fascist regime.

Structural and ideological reasons account for the non inclusion of Metaxas' regime amongst the most advanced corporatist systems in Europe. Metaxas based his philosophy of power heavily on tradition with an emphasis on the importance of chastity, family, the monarchy and (most notably) the Orthodox religion.¹⁵⁵ The Fourth of August regime, despite its offering of some 'new' forms of organization, did not, like the Fascists and the Nazis, look for an alternative 'modernity';

it looked to the past more than to the future.¹⁵⁶ In this sense, and without underestimating the post-1918 preponderance of the nationalist stream of corporatist thought, the religious difference between Greece (an overwhelmingly Orthodox country) and Catholic Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Vichy France and the Latin Americas, explains a great deal of the structural weakness of corporatist policies in inter-war Greece. Nevertheless, there are also other reasons that help to account for the incompleteness of corporatism in interbellum Greece. The belated and atrophic industrial development of the country, and the by and large fluid and undifferentiated industrial labour force, account for this lag of corporatist ideas. Greek industry consisted primarily of small mostly self-financed family businesses (in 1930, 70,644 out of 76,591 firms), which employed less than six workers.¹⁵⁷ Around 40 per cent of these minuscule industries operated seasonally, at intervals of three to nine months annually.¹⁵⁸ In addition, young unmarried women formed a high percentage of the workforce (23.2% in 1928), of whom 71 per cent (1930) ceased working in factories as soon as they got married (usually, in their early twenties). The workforce also contained large numbers of underage children, classed as 'apprentices' (6% in 1920), between the ages of 12 and 18.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, many male workers, especially the indigenous (i.e. not the refugee) unskilled labour, which accounted for almost 70 per cent of the labour force, saw their employment in factories as a temporary occupation, and as a stepping-stone on their way to climbing up the social ladder into the petit bourgeoisie, by opening a café or a shop, or entering the lower ranks of the burgeoning public service.¹⁶⁰ The small size of the overwhelming majority of industrial establishments, and the fluidity of the female as well as of the indigenous male labour force arguably hindered the structure of a coherent and permanent workforce that could be integrated into corporations. These objective conditions and subjective causes help to explain why Greece ultimately remained a marginal case for corporatist theory and practice in inter-war Europe.

Notes

1. Frank Bealey, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science* (Oxford 2004), 89.
2. Peter J. Williamson, *Varieties of Corporatism: A Conceptual Discussion* (Cambridge 1985), 4.
3. *Ibid.*, 3.
4. *Ibid.*, 4.
5. *Ibid.*, 19–20, 22.
6. See David Robertson, *The Penguin Dictionary of Politics* (London 1993), 117.
7. Williamson, *op. cit.*, 20–1.
8. Roger Scruton, *A Dictionary of Political Thought* (London 1996), 111.
9. Gudmund Hernes and Arne Selvik, 'Local Corporations', in Susanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics* (Cambridge 1986), 103.
10. Anthony Black, *Guilds and Civil Society in European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present* (London 1984), 200, 220–2.

11. Williamson, op. cit., 7, 11.
12. For a further discussion of neo-corporatism see e.g. Williamson, op. cit., 5, 11; Wyn Grant, 'Introduction', in W. Grant, ed., *The Political Economy of Corporatism* (London 1985), 1–14.
13. Williamson, op. cit., 9–11.
14. Antonis Liakos, *Εργασία και πολιτική στην Ελλάδα του Μεσοπολέμου: Το Διεθνές Γραφείο Εργασίας και η ανάπτυξη των κοινωνικών θεσμών* [Labour and Politics in Inter-War Greece: The International Labour Office and the Appearance of Social Institutions] (Athens 1993), 351; Erich Eyck, *A History of the Weimar Republic, Vol. II (From the Locarno Conference to Hitler's Seizure of Power)* (New York 1967), 110–14.
15. Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London and New York 1993), 44.
16. Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, New Jersey and Toronto 1964), 75.
17. Williamson, op. cit., 131.
18. Ibid., 22; Griffin, op. cit., 44.
19. Williamson, op. cit., 21.
20. Weber, op. cit., 77.
21. Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison, WI 1995), 38–9, 279.
22. A. James Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism* (New York and London 1969), 299; António Costa Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation* (New York 1995), 181.
23. Mark Mazower, *Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis* (Oxford 1991), 91–2.
24. Ibid., 92.
25. Ibid., 94; Petros Pizanias, *Οι φτωχοί των πόλεων. Η τεχνογνωσία της επιβίωσης στην Ελλάδα το Μεσοπόλεμο* [The Poor of the Cities: The Expertise of Survival in Inter-War Greece] (Athens 1993), 155.
26. Mazower, op. cit., 172–3.
27. Ibid., 237, 250–1.
28. Margarita Dritsa, *Βιομηχανία και τράπεζες στην Ελλάδα του Μεσοπολέμου* [Industry and Banks in Inter-War Greece] (Athens 1990), 120.
29. Pizanias, op. cit., 25–6, 155–6.
30. Dritsa, op. cit., 59–60, 73, 116, 199; Mazower, op. cit., 251–5, 269. The belief that Greece would remain a preponderantly agrarian country in the visible future was deeply ingrained in the minds of Greek economists, politicians and intellectuals at the time; see Dritsa, op. cit., 304.
31. Dritsa, op. cit., 119.
32. Liakos, op. cit., 416.
33. Ibid., 452.
34. Georgios S. Merkouris, *Η ανεργία* [The Unemployment] (Athens 1933), 21.
35. Ibid., 23.
36. Mazower, op. cit., 263; Alkis Pigos, *Η Β' Ελληνική Δημοκρατία 1924–1935: Κοινωνικές διαστάσεις της πολιτικής σκηνής* [The Second Greek Republic, 1924–1935: Social Dimensions of the Political Scene] (Athens 1992), 40–1.
37. George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1983), 145, 186.
38. Kostis Moskof, *Εισαγωγικά στην ιστορία του κινήματος της εργατικής τάξης: Η διαμόρφωση της εθνικής και κοινωνικής συνείδησης στην Ελλάδα* [Introductory

- Remarks to the History of the Movement of the Working-Class: The Shaping of the National and Social Conscience in Greece] (Athens 1985), 408–9; Mazower, *op. cit.*, 262.
39. Dritsa, *op. cit.*, 117–18. In 1931, about 25% of the workers were members of trade unions; see Alkis Rigos, *op. cit.*, 144.
 40. Moskof, *op. cit.*, 448–9; Angelos G. Elefantis, *Η επαγγελία της αδύνατης επανάστασης: Κ.Κ.Ε. και αστισμός στον Μεσοπόλεμο* [The Promise of an Impossible Revolution: KKE and the Bourgeoisie in the Inter-War Period] (Athens 1999), 119, 357, 406–7.
 41. Elefantis, *op. cit.*, 93.
 42. Mazower, *op. cit.*, 265–7.
 43. *Ibid.*, 268.
 44. *Ibid.*, 287; Mavrogordatos, *op. cit.*, 147, 151–2; S. Victor Papacosma, ‘Ioannis Metaxas and the “Fourth of August” Dictatorship in Greece’, in Bernd J. Fischer, ed., *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe* (London 2007), 179.
 45. Lila Leontidou, *Πόλεις της σιωπής: Εργατικός εποικισμός της Αθήνας και του Πειραιά, 1909–1940* [Cities of Silence: Labour Settlement in Athens and Piraeus, 1909–1940] (Athens 1989), 192.
 46. Mazower, *op. cit.*, 289.
 47. See Serge Bernstein and Pierre Milza, *Histoire du XXe siècle, Vol. I (La fin du ‘monde européen’, 1900–1945)* (Paris 1993), 256.
 48. See Grant, ‘Introduction’, *op. cit.*, 5; Jaime Ramón Olivares, ‘Corporatism’, in Rodney P. Carlisle, ed., *Encyclopedia of Politics: The Left and the Right, Vol. II (The Right)* (London and New Delhi 2005), 602.
 49. Williamson, *op. cit.*, 4, 22.
 50. *Ibid.*, 189.
 51. *Ibid.*, 26–7, 46–7, 58–9.
 52. Dimitris Gr. Tsakonas, *Ιδεαλισμός και μαρξισμός στην Ελλάδα* [Idealism and Marxism in Greece] (Athens 1988), 343–56. The main exponent of communitarianism (κοινοτισμός) in interbellum Greece was Konstantinos Karavidas (1890–1973), an officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The core of his theory was the ‘autonomous cooperative community’ of farmers, which ‘could restore to the individual family the vitality that it had lost because of its dependency on the over-centralistic state and the capital’. Karavidas’ communitarianism mostly referred to matters of agriculture; see K. D. Karavidas, *Σοσιαλισμός και κοινοτισμός (Δοκίμιο περί των γεωοικονομικών και κοινωνικών βάσεων του πολιτισμού των ελληνικών χωρών)* [Socialism and Communalism (Study on the Geo-economic and Social Basis of the Civilization of the Greek Lands)] (Athens 1930); Nikos Mouzelis, ‘Εισαγωγή’ [Introduction], in K. D. Karavidas, *Αγροτικά: Έρευνα επί της οικονομικής και κοινωνικής μορφολογίας εν Ελλάδι και εν ταις γειτονικαίς σλαϊκαίς χώραις. Μελέτη συγκριτική* [On Agriculture: Research on the Economic and Social Morphology of Greece and of the Neighbouring Slavic Countries; A Comparative Study] (Athens: Ministry of Agriculture, 1931, reprinted in Athens 1978), xiii; Mazower, *op. cit.*, 280–1, 302; Meletis H. Meletopoulos, *Κοινοτισμός: Το έργο του Κωνσταντίνου Καραβίδα και οι συγγενείς προσεγγίσεις* [Communitarianism: The Work of Konstantinos Karavidas and Similar Approaches] (Athens 2013), 57–339. The reason for the strong appeal of communitarianism to modern Greek intellectuals can be traced in its connection with

- Aristotle's philosophy, which is rightly often cited as a major source of communitarian thinking; see Henry Tam, *Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship* (London 1998), 18–19. For the historical evolution of communitarian ideas in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, see Tam, *op. cit.*, 18–23; Carlisle, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. I (*The Left*), 104–5.
53. K. Philaretos, 'Στροφή προς τους αιώνιους θεσμούς μας' [Turn to our centuries-old institutions], *Politismos*, 3 (April 1932), 228.
 54. [K. Philaretos], 'Αι κοινωνικά ασφαλίσεις, η κοινωνία και τα κόμματα' [Social insurances, the society and the parties], *Politismos*, 6 (July 1932), 534, 592–3.
 55. Dionysios Th. Someritis, *Περί της Γερουσίας εν Ελλάδι από θεωρητικής και ιστορικής απόψεως* [About the Senate in Greece from a Theoretical and an Historical Perspective] (Athens 1924), 28–9, 131, 137–9; see Eyck, *op. cit.*, 75–7.
 56. A. I. Svolos, *Το Νέον Σύνταγμα και αι βάσεις του πολιτεύματος* [The New Constitution and the Foundations of the Polity] (Athens 1928), 191, 195–203, 208–10; Giorgos Paschos, *Κράτος και πολιτεύματα στο έργο του Αλ. Σβώλου* [State and Politics in Al. Svolos' Work] (Salonica 1981), 66–89. In 1923, Svolos translated Léon Duguit's (a professor of Public Law at the University of Bordeaux) *Le droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l'État* (Paris 1911) [trans. Το κοινωνικόν δίκαιον, το ατομικόν δίκαιον και η μεταμόρφωσις του κράτους (Athens 1923)]. In his introduction (pp. ii–iii), Svolos argued that 'the complex organization of the social classes' should no longer be based upon 'struggle and violence, as the Marxists wish, but on social solidarity'; and he called for an 'economic representation of the social classes' within a 'Parliament of the professions'.
 57. Michel Dendias, *Le problème de la chambre haute et la représentation des intérêts à propos de l'organisation du Sénat grec* (Paris 1929), 149–53, 303.
 58. Mavrogordatos, *op. cit.*, 37 (fn. 15), 130–1 (fn. 58); Mazower, *op. cit.*, 267; Liakos, *op. cit.*, 217, 355, 357; Nikos K. Alivizatos, *Το Σύνταγμα και οι εχθροί του στη νεοελληνική ιστορία, 1800–2010* [The Constitution and its Enemies in Modern Greek History, 1800–2010] (Athens 2011), 265.
 59. Giorgos Theotokas, *Εμπρός στο κοινωνικό πρόβλημα* [Facing the Social Problem] (Athens 1932), reprinted in Giorgos Theotokas, *Στοχασμοί και θέσεις. Πολιτικά κείμενα 1925–1966* [Thoughts and Positions: Political Texts, 1925–1966], Vol. I (1925–1949) (Athens 1996), 194–5; see Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Ελληνικός φιλελευθερισμός: Το ριζοσπαστικό ρεύμα, 1932–1979* [Greek Liberalism: The Radical Trend, 1932–1979] (Athens 2010), 54–7, 151–2.
 60. Metaxas was more a figure of the radical authoritarian Right than a fascist revolutionary. Although a number of policies and outward trappings were borrowed from contemporary fascist regimes, Metaxas did not wholly embrace an established totalitarian ideology or set of practices. Lacking the mass party to reinforce his rule, Metaxas was obliged to share power with the king, who studiously remained in the background, and to seek the implicit support of the officer corps, which since the abortive republican coup of March 1935 was solidly royalist in its loyalties; see Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition* (Madison, WI 1980), 119–20; P. J. Vatikiotis, *Popular Autocracy in Greece, 1936–41: A Political Biography of General Ioannis Metaxas* (London and Portland, OR 1998), 185–95; Papacosma, *op. cit.*, 180–2, 186.
 61. Carlalberto Grillenzoni, *Το συντεχνιακόν κράτος* [The Corporatist State] (Athens 1935), 7.

62. Bruno Biagi, *Η παγκοσμιότητα των συντεχνιακών θεσμών* [The World-Wideness of the Corporatist Institutions] (Athens 1937); Aristides E. Vecchiarellis, *Το συντεχνιακό κράτος ως πολιτικόν δόγμα και ως οικονομική οργάνωσις* [The Corporatist State as a Political Doctrine and as an Economic Organization] (Athens 1937); Bruno Biagi, *Το συνδικάτον εις το πλαίσιον του φασιστικού συντεχνιακού συστήματος* [The Syndicate within the Framework of the Fascist Corporatist System] (Athens 1938). The Italian corporatist model was extensively publicized in Greece; see also: Giuseppe Bottai, 'Το φασιστικόν κορπορατιβιστικόν κράτος' [The Italian corporatist state], *Ergasia*, 246 (16 September 1934), 1198–200.
63. Ioannis M. Giannopoulos, *Η αστική οικονομία και ο σοσιαλισμός: Η από σχεδίου οικονομία – διευθυνομένη οικονομία – συντεχνιακόν σύστημα – φασισμός – εθνικοσοσιαλισμός* [Bourgeois Economy and Socialism: The Planned Economy; the Managed Economy; the Corporatist System; Fascism; National Socialism] (Athens 1939).
64. Michalis M. Psalidopoulos, *Η κρίση του 1929 και οι Έλληνες οικονομολόγοι: Συμβολή στην ιστορία της οικονομικής σκέψης στην Ελλάδα του Μεσοπολέμου* [The Crisis of 1929 and the Greek Economists: Contribution to the History of Economic Thought in Inter-War Greece] (Athens 1989), 163–5, 237, 257–64.
65. Demosthenes S. Stefanidis, *Εισαγωγή εις την εφηρμοσμένην κοινωνικήν οικονομικήν* [Introduction to Applied Social Economics] (Thessaloniki 1937), 133.
66. *Ibid.*, 133–4.
67. *Ibid.*, 45, 55.
68. *Ibid.*, 138–40.
69. *Ibid.*, 139–40.
70. *Ibid.*, 138.
71. *Ibid.*, 138, 140–1.
72. *Ibid.*, 86–9, 97.
73. *Ibid.*, 81–2, 91.
74. Michalis Psalidopoulos, *Πολιτική Οικονομία και Έλληνες διανοούμενοι: Μελέτες για την ιστορία της οικονομικής σκέψης στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα* [Political Economy and Greek Intellectuals: Studies in the History of Economic Thought in Contemporary Greece] (Athens 1999), 154–5. See, for instance: Georgios Asprakis, 'Αι θεωρητικάί βάσεις της φασιστικής σωματειακής οικονομίας' [The Theoretical Basis of the Italian Corporatist Economy], *Nea Politiki*, 1 (January 1937), 97–105; G. Christodoulidis, 'Το συντεχνιακόν σύστημα εις την Ιταλίαν' [The Corporatist System in Italy], *Nea Politiki*, 1 (January 1939), 46–66.
75. Psalidopoulos, *Πολιτική Οικονομία*, 160, 166.
76. *Ibid.*, 161.
77. Merkouris, *Η ανεργία*, 19.
78. *Ibid.*, 39.
79. Georgios S. Merkouris, 'Ο εθνικοσοσιαλισμός εν Ελλάδι' [National Socialism in Greece], *Politismos*, 5 (15 March 1933), 194–5.
80. Mazower, *op. cit.*, 281.
81. Georgios S. Merkouris, *Το συντεχνιακόν Κράτος* [The Corporatist State] (Athens 1936), 5.
82. *Ibid.*, 6.
83. *Ibid.*, 7, 11, 14, 16.

84. Ibid., 9.
85. Ibid., 8–9.
86. Ibid., 12–13, 23–6.
87. Ibid., 13.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid., 17.
90. Ibid., 16, 18, 20, 26.
91. Ibid., 15, 31.
92. Today, Metaxas' library is part of the Library of the Hellenic Parliament; see pertinent entries in <http://catalog.parliament.gr>.
93. Ioannis Metaxas, *Το προσωπικό του ημερολόγιο* [His Personal Diary], Vol. III (1921–1932), ed., Pan. M. Siphnaios (Athens 1963), 778–82; Vatikiotis, op. cit., 121–2.
94. For the consequences of the 6 March 1933 coup, see Mavrogordatos, op. cit., 338–41.
95. *Ephimeris ton Syzitiseon tis Voulis* [Gazette of Parliamentary Debates], period Γ–session A (Athens 1936), 9.
96. *Ephimeris ton Syzitiseon tis Voulis, period Δ – session Α* (Athens 1934), 9.
97. Metaxas, *Το προσωπικό του ημερολόγιο, Vol. IV (1933–1941)*, ed. Phaedon Vranas (Athens 1972), 592, 594.
98. Ibid., 206.
99. In view of the parliamentary elections of September 1932, Kondylis' National Radical Party professed 'the protection of the economically weak from the economically strong'; 'the advancement of the labour law and the institution of social security'; 'the protection of the working classes, which are in danger of coming under complete dependence from the capital'; 'the liberation of the working people from the exploitation of the capital'; see *Neon Kratos*, 5 (1 September 1932), 1; 22 (18 September 1932), 4.
100. Stamatis S. Merkouris, *Γεώργιος Κονδύλης 1879–1936* [Georgios Kondylis] (Athens 1954), 68, 171. On 12 September 1932, Kondylis was hailed by his supporters in Katerini (a town in Northern Greece) as 'the Mussolini of Greece'; see *Neon Kratos*, 17 (13 September 1932), 4.
101. *Οι εκφωνηθέντες λόγοι υπό του αντιβασιλέως προέδρου της κυβερνήσεως κ. Γεωργίου Κονδύλη* [The Delivered Speeches of the Regent and Premier Georgios Kondylis] (Athens 1935), 5; Merkouris, *Γεώργιος Κονδύλης*, 67.
102. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos* [Governmental Gazette], A Series, No. 465 (14 October 1935), 2313; No. 536 (8 November 1935), 2614.
103. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 379 (31 August 1936), 1979–80.
104. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 585 (20 November 1935), 2941–3; Liakos, op. cit., 518–9.
105. Mazower, op. cit., 268.
106. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 391 (7 September 1936), 2045.
107. Υψηπουργείον Τύπου και Τουρισμού [Deputy Ministry of Press and Tourism], *Τέσσερα χρόνια διακυβερνήσεως Ι. Μεταξύ 4 Αυγούστου 1936 – 4 Αυγούστου 1940* [Four Years of Metaxas' Government, 4 August 1936 – 4 August 1940], Vol. I (Γεωργική και κοινωνική μεταρρύθμισις) [Agrarian and Social Reform] [Athens 1940], 145–6.
108. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 391 (7 September 1936), 2045.
109. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 396 (24 October 1938), 2634.

110. Demosthenes S. Stefanidis, *Η θέση της βιομηχανίας εν τη κοινωνική μας οικονομία* [The Place of Industry in our Social Economy] (Thessaloniki 1938), 37.
111. Vatikiotis, op. cit., 161.
112. Papacosma, op. cit., 187.
113. See Metaxas' interview republished in *Kathimerini*, 5266 (26 September 1936), 1.
114. Mazower, op. cit., 290–1; Constantine Sarandis, 'The Ideology and Character of the Metaxas Regime', in Robin Higham and Thanos Veremis, eds, *The Metaxas Dictatorship: Aspects of Greece 1936–1940* (Athens 1993) 156–7.
115. Gr. Bamias, 'Οι αγρόται εις το Νέον Κράτος' [The Farmers in the New State], *To Neon Kratos*, 10 (June 1938), 662.
116. See Williamson, op. cit., 85–6.
117. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 135 (9 April 1937), 895.
118. Nikolaos D. Koumaros and Georgios A. Mantzoufas, 'Αι θεμελιώδεις συνταγματικά αρχαί του Νέου Κράτους' [The Fundamental Constitutional Tenets of the New State], *To Neon Kratos*, 11 (July 1938), 818.
119. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 350 (31 August 1939), 2349; Spyridon G. Ploumidis, 'Το καθεστώς Μεταξά, 1936–1940' [The Metaxas Regime, 1936–1940], in Evanthi Hatzivassiliou, ed., *Η δικτατορία του Ιωάννη Μεταξά 1936–1941* [The Ioannis Metaxas Dictatorship] (Athens 2010), 79.
120. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 206 (3 July 1940), 1707; see *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 93 (14 April 1925), 534–5.
121. See Avraham Barkai, *Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy* (New Haven, CT 1990), 129.
122. See Williamson, op. cit., 84–90, 96.
123. See Barkai, op. cit., 130.
124. For a further discussion of Metaxas' agrarian policy, see Spyridon Ploumidis, *Έδαφος και μνήμη στα Βαλκάνια: Ο 'γεωργικός εθνικισμός' στην Ελλάδα και στη Βουλγαρία (1927–46)* [Land and Memory in the Balkans: 'Peasantist Nationalism' in Greece and Bulgaria, 1927–46] (Athens 2011), 55–64.
125. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 118 (28 March 1938), 725–9; Yphipourgeion Tyrou kai Tourismou, op. cit., 108–9.
126. For Metaxas' speech, see *Kathimerini*, 8043 (2 December 1938), 5–6.
127. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 440 (26 November 1938), 2887–93; *Agrotikon Mellon*, 1 (26 November 1938), 2, 8 and no. 29 (10 June 1939), 2; Georgios Th. Phessopoulos, *Η Ελλάς κατά την τελευταίαν εικοσιπενταετίαν* [Greece in the Last Twenty-Five Years] (Athens 1939), 215–16; Chrysos Evelpidis, *Η γεωργία της Ελλάδος: Οικονομική και κοινωνική άποψις* [The Agriculture of Greece from an Economic and Social Aspect] (Athens 1944), 143.
128. See John T. S. Keeler, 'Corporatism and Official Union Hegemony: The Case of French Agricultural Syndicalism', in Berger, ed., op. cit., 186–7.
129. The Portuguese *casas do povo* were organizations consisting of both rural workers and landowners in a two-tier system of membership; a nationwide system of these organizations was established in all rural parishes in 1933. However, before 1937, when they eventually came to parallel the syndical bodies in industrial sectors, the *casas do povo* were nothing more than mutual aid societies; see Williamson, op. cit., 107–8, 112; Pinto, op. cit., 183.

130. See Renzo De Felice, ed., *Storia dell' Italia contemporanea, vol. III (Guerra e Fascismo, 1915–1929)* (Naples 1978), 406–7, 417; Giorgio Candeloro, *Storia dell' Italia moderna, vol. IX (Il fascismo e le sue guerre)* (Milan 1990), 149–50.
131. See Cesare Santoro, *Hitler – Deutschland von einem Ausländergesehen* (Berlin 1938), 298–9. The Hitlerite corporatism in agriculture was thoroughly presented in Dimitrios Th. Panou, *Η αγροτική πολιτική του εθνικοσοσιαλισμού και η σωματειακή οργάνωσις της γερμανικής γεωργίας* [The Agrarian Policy of National Socialism and the Corporatist Organization of German Agriculture] (Athens 1939), 9, 46, 50, 53–5.
132. *Kathimerini*, 5258 (18 September 1936), 2.
133. Pinto, op. cit., 207–8. For instance, see Manfred Zapp, 'Η παλαιά και νέα [II] ορτογαλλία. Το έργο του Ολιβέιρα Σαλαζάρ' [Old and New Portugal: The Work of Oliveira Salazar], *Neon Kratos*, 8 (April 1938), 425–46; 9 (May 1938), 543–59; Friedrich Schimburg, 'Σαλαζάρ (ο άνθρωπος και ο θρύλος του)' [Salazar: The Man Behind the Legend], *Neon Kratos*, 15 (November 1938), 1243–8.
134. *Agrotikon Mellon*, 31 (24 June 1939), 1; Ploumidis, 'Το καθεστώς Μεταξά', 80.
135. Barkai, op. cit., 145–6. It should be noted though that, in contrast to agriculture, where administrative bodies of the *Reichsnährstand* managed the whole course of processing and marketing agricultural products, industrial, artisan and trade associations in Nazi Germany had no authority over market or price policies; see Barkai, op. cit., 135.
136. Psalidopoulos, *Πολιτική Οικονομία*, 100–1, 129, 166–7; Ploumidis, 'Το καθεστώς Μεταξά', 78–9.
137. Υψηπουργείον Τυπου και Τουρισμου, op. cit., 109.
138. *Ibid.*
139. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., 161, 296–7; Rigos, op. cit., 152–3.
140. Dimitris G. Panagiotopoulos, *Αγροτικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος: Όψεις του αγροτικού κινήματος στην Ελλάδα* [Agrarian Party of Greece: Aspects of the Agrarianist Movement in Greece] (Athens 2010), 24, 43–4, 46, 49, 51.
141. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., 161, 213, 221–5; Elefantis, op. cit., 338, 348–9.
142. Υψηπουργείον Τυπου και Τουρισμου, op. cit., 147.
143. *Ibid.*, 149.
144. *Ibid.*, 200.
145. *Ephimeris tis Kyverniseos*, A Series, No. 396 (24 October 1938), 2633.
146. See Williamson, op. cit., 51.
147. Berstein and Milza, op. cit., 222.
148. Mazower, op. cit., 291–2; see also Vatikiotis, who notes (op. cit., 137) 'a perceptible move away from the elite liberalism to persistent (yet transient) forms of authoritarianism and autocracy' in Greece of the 1930s.
149. Υψηπουργείον Τυπου και Τουρισμου, op. cit., 200.
150. Vecchiarellis, *Το συντεχνιακό κράτος*, 62.
151. Grillenzoni, op. cit., 142–7.
152. Ploumidis, 'Το καθεστώς Μεταξά', 81.
153. Psalidopoulos, *Πολιτική Οικονομία*, 166.
154. For instance, the works that had been published by Tournakis, the most adamant promoter of the Italian corporatist model in the academy, before 1936 exclusively pertained to foreign trade and external migration (and not to corporatism); see Ioannis Tournakis, *Μετανάστευσις και μεταναστευτική πολιτική εν Ελλάδι* [Emigration and Migratory Policy in Greece] (Athens 1923); *Οικονομική Πολιτική*

- [Economic Policy], Vol. I (*Εξωτερική εμπορική πολιτική*) [Foreign Trade Policy] (Athens 1927); *Διεθνής μεταναστευτική κίνησης και μεταναστευτική πολιτική* [International Migratory Movement and Immigration Policy] (Athens 1931).
155. Payne, op. cit., 120–1; Vatikiotis, op. cit., 186–7; Ploumidis, ‘Το καθεστώς Μετάξά’, 71–2, 82.
156. See George L. Mosse, *Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality* (New York 1980), 187; Philip Morgan, *Fascism in Europe, 1919–1945* (London and New York 2003), 192; Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler* (Basingstoke 2007), 31, 362.
157. Dritsa, op. cit., 113; Mazower, op. cit., 93, 95.
158. Pizanias, op. cit., 56, 158.
159. Dritsa, op. cit., 63; Liakos, op. cit., 286; Pizanias, op. cit., 33, 36–8. The indigenous industrial labour by and large consisted of newcomers from the countryside. Unlike the refugees from Asia Minor, these internal migrants, which originated from smallholding peasant families, were not destitute and therefore not destined to remain in industry for the greater part of their lives: they retained their small property in the village and more easily incorporated themselves into clientelist political networks, which provided them with access to state employment; see Pizanias, op. cit., 42.
160. Mavrogordatos, op. cit., 144–5; Dritsa, op. cit., 65–6; Pizanias, op. cit., 19, 35–6, 47–9, 158–60; Elephantis, op. cit., 351–2.

Author Biography

Spyridon Ploumidis is a Lecturer in Modern Greek History at the Faculty of History and Archaeology, University of Athens. His most recent publications include: *Εθνοτική συμβίωση στα Βαλκάνια: Έλληνες και Βούλγαροι στη Φιλιππούπολη (1878–1906)* [Ethnic Symbiosis in the Balkans: Greeks and Bulgarians in Plovdiv (1878–1906)] (Athens 2006); *Η ελληνοβουλγαρική κρίση του 1924–25: Ο πόλεμος της ζωοκλοπής* [The Greco-Bulgarian Crisis of 1924–25: The War of Rustling] (Athens 2006); ‘British Propaganda Towards Greece (1940–1944)’, *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 6/4 (December 2006), 407–26; *Έδαφος και μνήμη στα Βαλκάνια. Ο ‘γεωργικός εθνικισμός’ στην Ελλάδα και στη Βουλγαρία (1927–46)* [Land and Memory in the Balkans: ‘Peasantist Nationalism’ in Greece and Bulgaria, 1927–46] (Athens 2011).